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NOTES
TAFT-HARTLEY SECTIONS 301 AND 303
PROCEDURAL ASPECTS
:The motives and purposes behind the binate Sections 301 and 303,
no less than other sections of the Taft-Hartley Act,' are mixed and
ambiguous.2 Foremost, however, seems the notion that Congress in-
tended to create new federal rights, contract and tort, enforceable
nationally in a federal forum. In broad terms, where the required
relationship to interstate commerce exists, Section 301 permits suits
by either employers or unions for violation of collective bargaining
agreements; Section 303 permits those injured by certain boycotts and
unlawful combinations3 to bring suit- in both cases, the forum pro-
vided is the district court of the United States. It is not the purpose
of this Note to discuss the elements or validity of a collective bargain-
ing agreement or a breach thereof, nor of concern is the problem of
the existence of the prohibited boycotts and combinations. The pro-
cedural provisions of Section 301 are incorporated by specific reference
in Section 303. Subject to the always inherent difficulties of distin-
guishing substance from procedure, this Note will be concerned with
procedural aspects of suits under the binate sections.
JURISDICTION
Section 301 grants to the district courts jurisdiction "without re-
spect to the amount in controversy or without regard to citizenship of
the parties," while Section 303 omits the latter phrase.4 Whatever the
reasons for the difference in phraseology, it is now settled that jurisdic-
tion is vested in the district courts without regard to either citizenship
or amount in controversy in suits under either section.5 The necessary
.1. 61 STAT. 136 (1947), 29 U.S.C.A. §§ 141 et seq. (Supp. 1953). Sections
301 and 303 are set out in the Appendix, infra p. 391.
2. See Judge Wyzanski's discussion in Textile Workers Union v. American
Thread Co., 113 F. Supp. 137, 32 LRRM 2205 (D. Mass. 1953), 7 VAND. L. REv. 140.
3. Section 303 does not use the words "second boycott:'; it deals with the
exercise by a labor oranization of secondary pressure in a labor dispute.
United Brick & Clay Workers v. Deena Artware, Inc., 198 F.2d 637, 30 LRRM
2485 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 344 U.S. 897 (1952).
4. See Hamilton Foundry & Machine Co. v. International Molders & Foundry
Workers Union, 193 F.2d 209, 29 LRRM 2223 (6th Cir. 1951), cert. denied,
343 U.S. 966 (1952) (action on contract arises under laws of United States);
Pepper & Potter, Inc. v. Local 977, UAW, 103 F. Supp. 684, 29 LRRM 2580
(S.D.N.Y. 1952).
5. See Schatte v. International Alliance of Theatrical Stage Employees, 182
F.2d. 158, 26 LRRM 2136 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 340 U.S. 827 (1950).
Jurisdiction is limited also to "an industry or activity affecting commerce."
Section 501 defines "industry affecting commerce" as "any industry or activity
in commerce or in which a labor dispute would burden or obstruct commerce
or tend to burden or obstruct commerce or the free flow of commerce."
For purposes of removal jurisdiction, a federal court may look beyond the
complaint to ascertain whether a union represents employees in an industry
affecting commerce. Fay v. American Cystoscope Makers, Inc., 98 F. Supp.
278, 28 LRRM 2103 (S.D.N.Y. 1951).
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foundation for federal jurisdiction in the binate sections, therefore,
must be that the exercise or enforcement of the rights enumerated in
those sections constitutes a case arising under the laws of the United
States.6 Creation of federal jurisdiction, without the concomitant crea-
tion of federal substantive rights,1 would have been unconstitutional.8
The invocation of federal question jurisdiction here is dependent
upon the appearance within the four corners of the complaint of a
statement of a cause of action as narrowly defined by the language
of Sections 301 and 303.9 Thus, for example, not cognizable under
these sections are actions involving intra-union squabbles concerning
contract violation'0 and actions for inducing breach of contract."
Jurisdiction may not be predicated merely upon Section 301 (b)
which allows suits by or against unions as entities. Procedural in
6. United Brick & Clay Workers v. Deena Artware, Inc., 198 F.2d 637, 30
LRRM 2485 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 344 U.S. 897 (1952); Pepper & Potter,
Inc. v. Local 977, UAW, 103 F. Supp. 684, 29 LRRM 2580 (S.D.N.Y. 1952); L.
Fatato, Inc. v. Beer Drivers Local Union 24, 93 F. Supp. 481, 27 LRRM 2032
(E.D.N.Y. 1950); UAW v. Wilson Athletic Goods Mfg. Co., 26 LRRM 2383 (N.D.
Ill. 1950); Banner Mfg. Co. v. United Furniture Workers, 90 F. Supp. 723, 25
LRRM 2498 (S.D.N.Y. 1950) (the first case to reach this result; a well-reasoned
analysis that §303 merely eliminates the jurisdictional amount provision of
§1331 of the Judicial Code); see International Longshoremen's & Warehouse-
men's Union v. Juneau Spruce Corp., 342 U.S. 237, 241-42, 72 Sup. Ct. 235, 96 L.
Ed. 275 (1952). Contra: Lach v. Hoisting & Portable Power Shovel & Dredge
Engineers Local 4, 86 F. Supp. 463, 24 LRRM 2528 (D. Mass. 1949).
7. United Electrical, Radio & Machine Workers v. Oliver Corp., 205 F. 2d
376, 32 LRRM 2270 (8th Cir. 1953); Hamilton Foundry & Machine Co. v. Inter-
national Molders & Foundry Workers Union, 193 F.2d 209, 29 LRRM 2223 (6th
Cir. 1951), cert. denied, 343 U.S. 966 (1952); Waialua Agricultural Co., Ltd. v.
United Sugar Workers, 114 F. Supp. 243, 32 LRRM 2440 (D. Hawaii 1953);
Wilson & Co. v. United Packinghouse Workers, 83 F. Supp. 162, 23 LRRM 2391
(S.D.N.Y. 1949); Colonial Hardwood Flooring Co. v. International Union United
Furniture Workers, 76 F. Supp. 493, 21 LRRM 2340 (D. Md. 1948). -
8. See Ludlow Mfg. & Sales Co. v. Textile Workers Union, 108 F. Supp.
45, 30 LRRM 2667 (D. Del. 1952).
9. Studio Carpenters Local Union No. 946 v. Loew's, Inc., 182 F.2d 168, 26
LRRM 2142 (9th Cir.) [mere threats insufficient under § 303(a) (4)3, cert.
denied, 340 U.S. 828 (1950); United Steel Workers v. Shakespeare Co., 84 F.
Supp. 267, 23 LRRM 2341 (W.D. Mich. 1949); Mills v. United Ass'n of Journey-
men, 8 F.R.D. 300, 22 LRRM 2539 (W.D. Mo. 1948). But cf. Bethlehem Steel Co.
v. Industrial Union of Marine & Shipbuilding Workers, 115 F. Supp. 231, 32
LRRM 2767 (E.D.N.Y. 1953) (held language of § 303 shows an intention on
part of Congress to give broad scope to the prohibitions in that section);
International Union of Operating Engineers v. William D. Baker Co., 100
F. Supp. 773, 28 LRRM 2670 (E.D. Pa. 1951) (district court has jurisdiction
under § 301 even though some parts of the relief requested may be beyond the
court's jurisdiction). An oral contract entered into during the life of a written
contract is valid and will support a § 301 action. United Shoe Workers' v. Le
Danne Footwear, Inc., 83 F. Supp. 714, 24 LRRM 2021 (D. Mass. 1949). Also
see Hamilton Foundry & Machine Co. v. International Molders & Foundry
Workers Union, 193 F.2d 214, 29 LRRM 2223 (6th Cir. 1951).
Section 301 does not apply retroactively. Studio Carpenters Local Union
No. 946 v. Loew's, Inc., 182 F.2d 168, 26 LRRM 2142 (9th Cir.), cert. denied,
340 U.S. 828 (1950); Schatte v. International Alliance of Theatrical Stage
Employees, 182 F.2d 158, 26 LRRM 2136 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 340 U.S: 827
(1950).
10. Kriss v. White, 87 F. Supp.'734,.25:LRRM 2130 (N.D.N.Y. 1949)-.
11. H. N. Thayer Co. v Binnali, 82 F. Supp. 566, 23 LRRM 2421 (D.Mass. 1949)
-375
VANDERBILT LAW REVIEW
nature, the provision is not a broad grant of jurisdiction over all
ca Vses in which unions may be involved.
12
Superimposed upon a background of jurisdictionally limited en-
forcement of related rights, the creation of federal rights by these
'sections raises the possibility of manifold and variegated conflicts of
jurisdiction.
Removal Jurisdiction
Removal of an action from the state to federal forum is dependent
upon the statement of a cause sufficient to bring it within the original
jurisdiction of the district courts.13 Therefore, where the relief sought
cannot be granted in a federal court, as for example, injunctive relief
precluded by the Norris-LaGuardia Act, most courts decline removal
jurisdiction. 14
There exist state counterparts of the rights created in these sections.
The extent to which a plaintiff may rely upon these state rights, and
disclaim federal rights, in moving to remand, is not clear.15 One
(no jurisdiction under § 301 of action against one union for inducing a breach
of contract between plaintiff employer and another union). See also Sterling
v. Steam and Power Pipe Fitters' and Helpers' Local No. 438, 31 LRRM 2389 ( D.
Md. 1953) (no jurisdiction under § 301 over action by business manager against
union employer for breach of employment contract); Wright & Morissey, Inc.
v. Burlington Local No. 522, 106 F. Supp. 138, 30 LRRM 2649 (D. Vt. 1952)
(action .against union picketing to obtain a closed shop agreement held not
within original jurisdiction of district court); Murphy v. Hotel & Restaurant
-Employees & Bartenders International Union, 102 F. Supp. 488, 28 LRRM
2370 (E.D. Mich. 1951). But cf. R. 0. Stenzel & Co. v. Department Store Pack-
age, Helpers Local Union No. 955, 11 F.R.D. 362, 28 LRRM 2607 (W.D. Mo.
.1951);. Fitzgerald v. Dictograph Products, Inc., 28 LRRM 2611 (N.Y. Sup. Ct.
..1951) (federal court has jurisdiction over action against one union for con-
spiring to induce the employer to breach his contract with plaintiff union).
12. Amazon Cotton Mill Co. v. Textile Workers Union, 167 F.2d 183, 21
LRRM 2605 (4th Cir. 1948); Kriss v. White, supra note 10.
13. The grounds for removal are to be determined at time of removal, not
-when later amended. Thus an action will not be remanded where a com-
plaint originally praying for damages and an injunction was subsequently
amended to ask only for injunctive relief. Direct Transit Lines, Inc. v. Local
Union No. 406, 30 LRRM 2471 (W.D. Mich. 1952). See also Nash-Kelvinator
Corp. v. Grand Rapids Bldg. and Const. Trades Council, 30 LRRM 2466 (W.D.
Mich. 1952); cf. Isbrandtsen Co. v Schelero, 118 F. Supp. 579, 33 LRRM 2398
(E.D.N.Y. 1954); United Mineral & Chemical Corp. v. Katz, 118 F. Supp. 433,
33 LRRM 2453 (E.D.N.Y. 1954).
14. Castle & Cooke Terminals, Ltd. v. Local 137, 110 F. Supp. 247, 31 LRRM
'2480 (D. Hawaii 1953); American Optical Co. v. Andert, 108 F. Supp. 252, 31
LRRM 2312 (W.D. Mo. 1952); Corrado Bros., Inc. v. Building and Const. Trades
Council of Delaware, 29 LRRM 2141 (D. Del. 1951). Contra: Direct Transit
Lines, Inc. v. Local Union No. 406, 29 LRRM 2492 (W.D. Mich.), mandamus
denied, 199 F.2d 89, 31 LRRM 2004 (6th Cir. 1952). Cf. Isbrandtsen Co. v.
Schelero, 118 F. Supp. 579, 33 LRRM 2398 (E.D.N.Y. 1954); United Mineral
& Chemical Corp. v. Katz, 118 F. 'Supp. 433, 33 LRRM 2453 (E.D.N.Y. 1954).
This inability of the federal courts to provide injunctive relief has been con-
strued as an indication that Congress did not pre-empt the field. Associated
Telephone Co., Ltd. v. Communication Workers, 114 F. Supp. 334, 32 LRRM
2485 (S.D. Cal. 1953).
15. Plaintiff may be directed by the Board to see state relief. Irving Subway
Grating Co. v. Silverman, 117 F. Supp. 671, 33 LRRM 2293 (E.D.N.Y. 1953).
"Plaintiff has elected to pursue a remedy available under state law." Associated
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view suggests that the court may take judicial notice of the federal
laws brought into play by allegations of the complaint, though no
,reference is made to them and though the plaintiff -expressly dis-
claims any desire or intention to recover on other than a purely state
cause of action.16 Indeed, a federal court may look beyond the com-
plaint to ascertain a jurisdictional fact, for example, to ascertain
whether a union represents employees in an industry affecting com-
merce.1 7 Another view suggests that, since the cause does not neces-
sarily arise under a federal act, the plaintiff may rely upon state law
and thus avoid removal. 18 Necessary to this view is the conclusion that
federal jurisdiction is not exclusive and that Congress did not intend
to pre-empt the field through enactment of these sections.19
Federal v. State Jurisdiction
Though Congress has power to provide for the exclusiveness of the
federal remedy and jurisdiction,20 most state courts have held that
there is an absence of an intention on the part of Congress to -pre-empt
the field through enactment of these sections; they, therefore, retain
jurisdiction.
21
Telephone Co., Ltd. v. Communication Workers, 114 F. Supp. 334, 337, 32
LRRM 2485 (S.D. Cal. 1953).
16. Direct Transit Lines, Inc., v. Local Union No. 406, 29 LRRM 2492 (W.D.
Mich. 1952); New Broadcasting Co. v. Kehoe, 94 F. Supp. 113, -27. LRRM
2156 (S.D.N.Y. 1950).
17. Fay v. American Cystoscope Makers, Inc., 98 F. Supp. 278, 28; LRRM
2103 (S.D.N.Y. 1951).
18. Irving Subway Grating Co. v. Silverman, 117 F. Supp. 671, 33 LRRM
2293 (E.D.N.Y. 1953).
19. Compare Associated Telephone Co., Ltd. v. Communitation Wbtkers, 114
F. Supp. 334, 32 LRRM 2485 (S.D. Cal. 1953), with Fay v. AmericanCystoscope
Makers, Inc., 98 F. Supp. 278, 28 LRRM 2103 (S.D.N.Y. 1951)
20. Fay v. American Cystoscope Makers, Inc., 98 F. Supp. 27.8i 28 LRRM
2103 (S.D.N.Y. 1951). Of course, the pre-emption can only be. co-extensive
with the source of power - the Interstate Commerce Clause of the Consti-
tution. Ibid. See also General Electric Co. v. International Union, UAW, 93
Ohio App. 139, 108 N.E.2d 211, 30 LRRM 2607 (1952).
21. "[The] Federal Government has [not] legislated so comprehensively on
the subject of contract violations as to preclude state action." Wisconsin Em-
ployment Relations Board v. Bookbinders and Bindery Women's Local No.
49, 28 LRRM 2515, 2517 (Wis. Cir. Ct. 1951) (state statute made contract
violation an unfair labor practice). See also Winkelman Bros. Apparel, Inc.
v. Local Union No. 299, 31 LRRM 2016 (Mich. Cir. Ct. 1952); Brotherhood of
Painters, Decorators and Paperhangers v. Acorn Decorating Corp., 28 LRRM
2610 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1951) (contempt order granted for violation of injunction
against breach of union contract); General Electric Co. v. International Union
UAW, 93 Ohio App. 139, 108 N.E.2d 211, 30 LRRM 2607 (1952) (jurisdiction
conferred on federal courts by § 301 is merely cumulative and not exclusive);
Masetta v. National Bronze & Aluminum Foundry Co., 107 N.E.2d 243, 30
LRRM 2081 (Ohio App. 1952), rev'd, 159 Ohio St. 306, 112 N.E.2d 15 (1953);
Weisfield's Inc. v. Haeckel, 28 LRRM 2055 (Ore. Cir. Ct. 1951); General Bldg.
Contractors Ass'n v. Local Unions, 370 Pa. 73, 87 A.2d 250 (1952); Texas State
Federation of Labor v. Brown & Root, Inc., 29 LRRM 2467 (Tex. Civ. App.
1952). Contra: Norris Grain Co. v. Nordaas, 27 LRRM 2323 (Minn. Sup. Ct.
1951); Fitzgerald v. Dictograph Products, Inc., 28 LRRM 2611 (N.Y. Sup. Ct.
1951). Federal courts have also recognized the presence of state jurisdiction.
Associated Telephone Co., Ltd. v. Communication Workers, 114 F. Supp. 334,
1954]
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Arguments against federal pre-emption through the binate sections
are-based upon the inadequacy or unavailability of a remedy in the
federal forum22 and the unlikelihood that Congress, without express
words of exclusion, would have precluded state action in so broad a
field.23 In contrast to these arguments stands the broad implication of
Garner v., Teamsters, Chauffers and Helpers Local Union No. 776,24
beyond its particular holding, which is that activities cognizable under
the Act, remediable or not remediable thereunder, are within the ex-
32 LRRM 2485 (S.D. Cal. 1953); Irving Subway Grating Co. v. Silverman,
117 F. Supp. 671, 33 LRRM 2293 (E.D.N.Y. 1953); Patton v. United Mine
Workers, 114 F. Supp. 596, 32 LRRM 2642 (W.D. Va. 1953); Louisville & Nashville
R.R. v. Local Union No. 432, 104 F. Supp. 748, 30 LRRM 2090 (S.D. Ala. 1952).
Contra: Direct Transit Lines, Inc. v. Local Union 406, 29 LRRM 2492, 30 LRRM
2471 (W.D. Mich.), mandamus denied, 199 F.2d 89 (6th Cir. 1952); Nash-
Kelvinator Corp. v. Grand Rapids Bldg. and Const. Trades Council, 30 LRRM
2466 (W.D. Mich. 1952); Fay v. American Cystoscope Makers, Inc., 98 F. Supp.
278, 28 LRRM 2103 (S.D.N.Y. 1951). In some instances special circumstances
such as fraud or violence must be shown. Montgomery Bldg. and Const. Trades
Councilv. Ledbetter Erection Co., 256 Ala. 678, 57 So.2d 112, cert. dismissed, 344
U.S. 178 (1952). New York in particular has circumvented the exclusive fed-
eral jurisdiction problem by meticulous characterization of the issues. Is-
brandtsen Co. v. Schelero, 118 F. Supp. 579, 33 LRRM 2398 (E.D.N.Y. 1954)
(no labor dispute); United Mineral & Chemical Corp. v. Katz, 118 F. Supp. 433,
33 LRRM 2453 (E.D.N.Y. 1954) (picketing accompanied by violence tor-
tious); S-M News Co. v. Simons, 279 App. Div. 364, 30 LRRM 2163 (lst
Dep't 1952); G., H. & E. Freyberg, Inc. v. International Ladies' Garment
Workers' Union, 33 LRRM 2402 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1954) (ortious picketing);
Cortlaindt Co. Department Store v. Cohen, 33 LRRM 2303 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1953)
(no interstate commerce).
22. Of particular concern to the state employer is the lack of injunctive
relief because of the prohibitions of the Norris-LaGuardia Act. The state
courts feel that some protection of business and property must be afforded,
especially after consideration is made of the NLRB's discretionary jurisdiction
policy. Montgomery Bldg. and Const. Trades Council v. Ledbetter Erection
Co., 256 Ala. 678, 57 So.2d 112 (1952); General Bldg. Contractors Ass'n v. Local
Unions, 370 Pa. 73, 87 A.2d 250 (1952); Texas State Federation of Labor v.
Brown & Root, Inc., 29 LRRM 2467 (Tex. Civ. App. 1952). The argument
based on the unavailability of injunctive relief to private parties is somewhat
reduced in light of the fact that § 10 makes injunction available to the NLRB
in certain unfair labor practice situations. Since both the activity and relief are
cognizable somewhere in the act, express exclusions within each section would
seem unnecessary to pre-emption. But query, if Congress conferred jurisdic-
tion on the district courts for the sole purpose of actions for damages, whether
the states retain the residue of their traditionally exercised jurisdiction, in-
cluding power to issue injunctions. "Since we hold that the statute does
not confer jurisdiction on a District court to entertain or grant an injunction
under Sec, 301 (a) of the Labor Management Act, a fortiori, we hold that by the
enactment of Sec. 301 (a) Congress has not pre-empted the field to the ex-
clusion of state action." Associated Telephone Co., Ltd. v. Communication
Workers,. 114 F. Supp. 334, 341, 32 LRRM 2485 (S.D. Cal. 1953). But, a district
court may have jurisdiction under § 301 even though some parts of the relief
requested may be beyond the court's jurisdiction. International Union of
Operating Engineers v. William D. Baker Co., 100 F. Supp. 773, 28 LRRM
2670 (E.D. Pa. 1951).
23. General Electric Co. v. International Union UAW, 93 Ohio App. 139,
108 NE.2d 211, 30 LRRM 2607 (1952) (language of § 301 is permissive not
mandatory; Congress has right to exclude state jurisdiction over traditionally
state matter but express words of exclusion should be required).
24. 74 Sup. Ct. 161 (1953). As to the scope of the reservation to the states of
police power over essentially local matters, see 7 VAND. L. REv. 422 (1954). For
cases distinguishing the Garner case, see United Mineral & Chemical Corp. v.
Katz, 118 F. Supp. 433, 33 LRRM 2453 (E.D.N.Y. 1954); Irving Subway Grating
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clusive federal domain. If this implication is extended to Sections
301 and 303 it leads to the conclusion that the jurisdiction and remedies
provided thereunder are exclusively federal.25
Not necessarily inconsistent with the concept of pre-emption, the
argument has been advanced that the grant in Section 303 (b) to
"any other court having jurisdiction of the parties" confers jurisdiction
on state courts26 similar in effect to the Federal Employers Liability
Act. While this language on its face may permit of such an interpreta-
tion, reference to the over-all policy of uniformity patent throughout
the Act suggests that a much more explicit conferral should be re-
quisite to such a conclusion.
27
District Court v. NLRB Jurisdiction
Within the federal sphere itself, there arise conflicts of jurisdiction.
The Board, vested with jurisdiction over unfair labor practices, to
enforce its determinations is permitted and in some cases required to
seek injunctive relief.28 Activity which constitutes a breach of con-
tract under Section 301 may also be an unfair labor practice;29 the
activity giving rise to a Section 303 action must necessarily be an un-
fair labor practice.30 Congress must have been cognizant of the
overlapping of the binate sections with the unfair labor practice pro-
Co. v. Katz, 117 F. Supp. 671, 33 LRRM 2293 (E.D.N.Y. 1953); G., H. & E.
Freyberg, Inc. v. International Ladies' Garment Workers' Union, 33 LRRM
2402 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1954); Cortlandt Co. Department Store v. Cohen, 33
LRRM 2303 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1953).
25. "[I]n the light of the determination that the section [301] creates a new,
federal, substantive right ... it seems clear that Congress preempted the field
in this area." Fay v. American Cystoscope Makers, Inc., 98 F. Supp. 278, 28
LRRM 2103 (S.D.N.Y. 1951).
26. A California court was persuaded by the argument. Ensher v. Fresh
Fruit and Vegetable Workers Union, 20 LRRM 2614 (Cal. Super. Ct. 1947).
Contra: Bunch v. Launius, 33 LRRM 2263 (Ark. Sup. Cf. 1953); Gerry of
California v. International Ladies' Garment Workers' Union, 21 LRRM 2209
(Cal. Super Ct. 1948).
27. In International Longshoremen's & Warehousemen's Union v. Juneau
Spruce Corp., 342 U.S. 237, 72 Sup. Ct. 235, 96 L. Ed. 275 (1952), the Court
indicated that "any other court" may refer to a court having the jurisdiction
of a district court as, for example, a territorial court. The Court held, however,
the District Court for the Territory of Alaska to be a "district court" for the
purposes of § 303.
28. Section 8 defines certain activities by employers and unions, as unfair
labor practices; Section 10(a) empowers the Board to prevent commission of
unfair labor practices; Section 10(e) provides for court enforcement of Board
orders relative to unfair labor practices; Section 10(j) allows the Board to
seek a temporary injunction against any unfair labor practice; Section 10(1)
requires the Board to seek court injunction against certain types of secondary
pressure by labor organizations.
29. Brady Transfer & Storage Co. v. Local No. 710, 30 LRRM 2535 (N.D. Ill.
1952) (objection to jurisdiction of action for violation of contract on ground
court was without jurisdiction to remedy an unfair labor practice held un-
tenable); Reinauer Transp. Cos. v. United Marine Division, ILA, 112 F. Supp.
940, 32 LRRM 2054 (S.D.N.Y. 1953) (court is not without jurisdiction of action
for damages under § 301 on theory that union's conduct is an unfair labor
practice'under § 8 (b) (2) over which NLRB has jurisdiction).
30. In the drafting of the Taft-Hartley Act there was some consideration




visions in terms of activities; completely concurrent jurisdiction of
the Board and the district courts could not have been intended. The
necessary distinction in their respective jurisdictions must be in terms
of remedies available before each forum.
Generally where injunctive relief is sought, the district courts de-
cline jurisdiction in favor of the Board.3 ' Collaterally, the Board, in
the consideration of a petition for representation, has refused to act
upon the allegation of the existence of a secondary boycott, noting
that a remedy therefor may be an action under 303 for damages.3 2
Parties may not be including a provision against unfair labor prac-
tices in the collective bargaining agreement vest the courts with
jurisdiction generally where exclusive jurisdiction is reposed in the
Board.3 3 Where, however, substantive rights with respect to such
matters as positions or pay are created by contract, district courts
may enforce the agreements though the breach is also an unfair labor
practice.34 In a suit for damages, the fact that other redress is possible
in another tribunal such as the NLRB does not deny a plaintiff his
rights under Sections 301 or 305.3 Nor is a Board determination of
the existence of a secondary boycott a prerequisite to the court's juris-
diction in a 303 action.
6
Venue
Venue in actions against labor organizations may be laid in the dis-
trict of the union's principal office or in any district where the union
is engaged in representing or acting for employee members.3 7 These
provisions are not broad grants superseding existing venue provi-
31. Amalgamated Ass'n of Street, Elec. Ry. and Motor Coach Employees v.
Dixie Motor Coach Corp., 170 F.2d 902, 23 LRRM 2092 (8th Cir. 1948); Amazon
Cotton Mill Co. v. Textile Workers Union, 167 F.2d 183, 21 LRRM 2605 (4th Cir.
1948); Direct Transit Lines, Inc. v. Local Union No. 406, 30 LRRM 2471 (W.D.
Mich. 1952) (district court retained jurisdiction pending proof of fraud or
violence; in absence of such proof, NLRB has jurisdiction); United Packing-
house Workers v. Wilson & Co., 80 F. Supp. 563, 22 LRRM 2297 (N.D. Ill.
1948). But. cf. Associated. Telephone Co., Ltd. v. Communication Workers,
114 F. Supp. 334, 32 LRRM 2485 (S.D. Cal. 1953); Louisville & Nashville R.R.
v. Local Union No. 432, 104 F. Supp. 748, 30 LRRM 2090 (S.D. Ala. 1952) (no
labor dispute).
32. Parks-Belk Co. of Elizabethton, 77 N.L.R.B. 429, 22 LRRM 1036 (1948).
33. See* Textile Workers Union v. Arista Mills Co., 193 F.2d 529, 533, 29
LRRM 2264 (4th Cir. 1951).
34. Textile Workers Union v. Arista Mills Co., supra note 33; Reed v. Fawick
Airflex Co., 24 LRRM 2568 (N.D. Ohio 1949). No claim may be based solely
on an unfair labor practice. Reed v. Fawick Airflex Co., supra; International
Longshoremen's & Warehousemen's Union v. Sunset Line & Twine Co., 77 F.
Supp. 119, 21 LRRM 2635 (N.D. Cal. 1948) (refusal to bargain).
35. Ludlow Mfg. & Sales Co. v. Textile Workers Union, 108 F. Supp. 45,
30 LRRM 2667 (D. Del. 1952).
36. International Longshoremen's & Warehousemen's Union v. Juneau
Spruce Corp., 342 U.S. 237, 72 Sup. Ct. 235, 96 L. Ed. 275 (1952) (§ 8(b) (4) (D)
and § 303 (a) (4) provide separate remedies).
37. See Section 301(c), Appendix. See also Colonial Hardwood Flooring Co.
v. International Union, United Furniture Workers, 76 F. Supp. 493, 21 LRRM
2340 (D. Md. 1948) (Union argument that venue properly laid only in district
in which union an inhabitant was not tenable).
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sions.3 8 They do not, for example, deprive another party of his per-
sonal venue privileges. 39 Nor do they serve to broaden the jurisdiction
of the federal courts. 40
The forum non conveniens provisions of Section 1404 (a) of the
Judicial Code are, applicable. In accordance therewith actions have
been transferred to other districts where the company has its principal
place of business, the union has its principal office, the parties have
executed the collective bargaining agreement, the employees live and
most witnesses are to be found.41
Service of Process
Section 301 (d) provides that service on an officer or agent of a labor
organization, in his capacity as such, constitutes service on the .labor
organization.42 Due process requirements -service reasonably calcu-
lated to give notice and opportunity to be heard - are superimposed on
this provision.43 Thus service on a nondescript union employee, hired
for minor duties, does not constitute service on the union.44 Correlative
is the problem of whether service on a local or international union is
sufficient to bring in the other.45 An answer depends upon a considera-
tion of such factors as unity in relations, dominant control by the
international, 46 the utilization of the local by the international as its
agency and the autonomy of the unions with some reference to their
constitutions. 47 Possible also is an implied ratification of service
through delay in making an objection.4 8
38. 28"U.S.C.A. § 1391 (1950).
39. International Ass'n of Machinists v. Smiley, 76 F. Supp. 800, 21 LRRM
2574 (E.D. Pa. 1948).
40. Brooks v. Hunkin-Conkey Const. Co., 95 F. Supp. 608, 27 LRRM 2315
(W.D. Pa. 1951); Rock Drilling and Common Laborers' Local Union No. 17
v. Mason & Hangar Co., 90 F. Supp. 539, 26 LRRM 2218 (S.D.N.Y. 1950).
41. Flight Engineers Ass'n v. United Air Lines, Inc., 23 LRRM 2283 (S.D.N.Y.
1949); see International Union of Electrical Workers v. United Electrical
Workers, 192 F.2d 847, 29 LRRM 2170 (6th Cir. 1951); see also Fitzgerald v.
Niles Bement Pond Co., 274 App. Div. 499, 84 N.Y.S.2d 779, 23 LRRM 2222
(1st Dep't 1948) (N.Y. state court refused jurisdiction because action affected
labor relations and police power of another state).
42. See Claycraft Co. v. United Mine Workers, 204 F.2d 600, 32 LRRM 2124
(6th Cir. 1953).
43. Wilson & Co. v. United Packinghouse Workers, 83 F. Supp. 162, 23 LRRM
2391 (S.D.N.Y. 1949).
44. National Organization, Masters, Mates and Pilots v. Banks, 196 F.2d 428,
30 LRRM 2074 (5th Cir. 1952).
45. Claycraft Co. v. United Mline Workers, 204 F.2d 600, 32 LRRM 2124 (6th
Cir. 1953); Isbrandtsen Co. v. National Marine Engineers' Ben. Ass'n, 9 F.R.D.
541, 25 LRRM 2068 (S.D.N.Y. 1949) (service on assistant business manager
of local insufficient as to international; local an autonomous entity, not an
agent); Daily Review Corp. v. International Typographical Union, 9 F.R.D. 295,
24 LRRM 2043, motion to set aside service denied, 24 LRRM 2179 (1949),
rev'd, 26 LRRM 2503 (E.D.N.Y. 1950).
46. International Union of Operating Engineers v. Jones Const. Co., 240
S.W.2d 49, 28 LRRM 2422 (Ky. Ct. App. 1951).
47. Claycraft Co. v. United Mine Workers, 204 F.2d 600, 32 LRRM 2124 (6th
Cir. 1953).




While Federal Rule 4 (f) provides for extra-territorial service Where
granted by statute, no such grant is found in the Taft-Hartley Act.49
PRACTICE
Routine application of the federal rules has minimized problems of
practice and procedure under the binate sections. However, some
twilight procedure-substance questions, not completely covered there-
by, have arisen.
Parties
Section 301 (b), applicable to actions under both sections, provides
that a labor organization may sue or be sued as an entity.50 Beyond
this, however, no specific direction is given as to the parties, in whose
favor or against whom run the rights created by these sections. Sec-
tion 301 (a) is merely a grant of jurisdiction, without mention of par-
ties;51 Section 303 (b), again granting jurisdiction, notwithstanding the
broad indication that anyone injured in his business may sue, is equally
uninformative. In large measure, differences in the inherent nature
of actions in tort or contract dictate the propriety of party procedure.
The courts, perhaps limited by traditional notions, have been more
strict in the 301 contract actions 52 than in the 303 tort actions. One
49. Daily Review Corp. v. International Typographical Union, 9 F.R.D. 295,
24 LRRM 2043, motion to set aside service denied, 24 LRRM 2179 (E.D.N.Y.
1949), rev'd, 26 LRRM 2503 (E.D.N.Y. 1950).
50. Wilson & Co. v. United Packinghouse Workers, 83 F. Supp. 162, 23 LRRM
2391 (S.D.N.Y. 1949); Kaye and Allen, The Suability of Unions, 1 LAB. LAW. J.
705 (1950). It has been suggested that the application of § 301 (b) is not
limited to suits for violation of collective bargaining contracts. Rock Drilling
and Common Laborers' Local Union No. 17 v. Mason & Hangar Co., 90 F. Supp.
539, 26 LRRM 2218 (S.D.N.Y. 1950). Early doubts whether Congress con-
templated suits by unions for breach of contract have been dispelled. See
International Longshoremen's and Warehousemen's Union v. Libby, McNeill
& Libby, 114 F. Supp. 249, 32 LRRM 2588 (D. Hawaii 1953). Almost half the
actions brought under § 301 have been by labor organizations.
51. "All the statute talks about is a suit for violation of the contract; it does
not say who may or who may not sue." Isbrandtsen Co. v. Local 1291, 204 F.2d
495, 496, 32 LRRM 2091 (3d Cir. 1953). Section 301 (b) doesnot enlarge the juris-
diction of federal courts. Rock Drilling and Common Laborers' Local Union
No. 17 v. Mason & Hangar Co., 90 F. Supp. 539, 26 LRRM 2218 (S.D.N.Y. 1950).
In large measure, the problem is the substantive one of the nature of a
collective bargaining agreement, a matter long in dispute. See MATHEWS,
LABOR RELATIONS AND THE LAW 306 (1953); Livengood, Labor Contracts and
the Taft-Hartley Act, 26 N.C.L. Ruv. 1 (1947).
52. State practice in breach of collective bargaining agreement actions is
generally more liberal. See, e.g., Smith v. Arkansas Motor Freight Lines, Inc.,
214 Ark. 553, 217 S.W.2d 249, 23 LRRM 2414 (1949) (officials of union have
capacity to bring representative action for specific performance; union mem-
bers too numerous to be joined); Masetta v. National Bronze & Aluminum
Foundry Co., 107 N.E.2d 243, 30 LRRM 2081 (Ohio App. 1952) (class action),
rev'd, 159 Ohio St. 306, 112 N.E.2d 15 (1953); Weisfield's Inc. v. Haeckel, 28
LRRM 2055 (Ore. Cir. Ct. 1951) (rebellious union members). But cf. MacKay
v. Loew's, Inc., 182 F.2d 170, 26 LRRM 2143 (9th Cir.) (closed shop contract
is obligation created for benefit of union and not individual members), cert.
denied, 340 U.S. 828 (1950).
[VOL. 7
NOTES
court has required that the action be limited to formal signatory par-
ties.53 Other courts, however, have permitted an action against re-
bellious union members54 and an action against a union, not signatory
to the contract, for conspiracy with the contracting union to breach
the contract with the employer.55 There is some indication that a third
party beneficiary may sue;5 6 plaintiffs attempting to bring themselves
within this category, however, have to date been unsuccessful. A
ship charterer, not referred to specifically in the contract between a
shipping company and a longshoremen's union, was held not be a
third party beneficiary;5 7 similarly, an employer, a member of an em-
ployers' association which had negotiated a contract for the benefit
of its members, had no rights as a beneficiary.58
Employees are not proper parties to bring 301 suits for violation of
collective bargaining agreements, either individually5 9 or collectively
through use of the class action device.6 0 They may, however, join in
a suit by a union.61 As a corollary, the union is an indispensable party
53. Ketcher v. Sheet Metal Workers' Internat. Ass'n, 115 F. Supp. 802 (E.D.
Ark. 1953); see Colonial Hardwood Flooring Co. v. International Union United
Furniture Workers, 76 F. Supp. 493, 495, 21 LRRM 2340 (D. Md.), afj'd on other
grounds, 168 F.2d 33, 22 LRRM 2102 (4th Cir. 1948) (contract must have been
executed by international for it to be proper party; question determined on
evidence and not on motion to dismiss). But cf. Stenzel & Co. v. Department
Store Package Helpers Local Union No. 955, 11 F.R.D. 362, 28 LRRM 2607
(W.D. Mo. 1951).
54. Stenzel & Co. v. Department Store Package Helpers Local Union No.
955, 11 F.R.D. 362, 28 LRRM 2607 (W.D. Mo. 1951). But a union which induced a
breach of contract between plaintiff employer and another union may not be
sued under § 301. H. N. Thayer Co. v. Binnall, 82 F. Supp. 566, 23 LRRM 2421
(D. Mass. 1949).
55. See Alcoa S.S. Co. v. McMahon, 173 F.2d 567, 568, 23 LRRM 2533 (2d Cir.
1949).
56. See Isbrandtsen Co. v. Local 1291, 107 F. Supp. 72, 74, 30 LRRM 2551
(E.D. Pa. 1952), ai'fd, 204 F.2d 495, 32 LRRM 2091 (3d Cir. 1953) (court
specifically did "not take up the thorny question of whether the courts under
Section 301(a) have jurisdiction over a suit brought by a third-party
beneficiary"). Collective bargaining agreements have sometimes been held
to be third party beneficiary contracts for the benefit of employees. MATHEWS,
LABOR RELATIONS AND THE LAW 307 (1953).
57. Isbrandtsen Co. v. Local 1291, 107 F. Supp. 72, 30 LRRM 2551 (E.D. Pa.
1952), affd, 204 F.2d 495, 32 LRRM 2091 (3d Cir. 1953) (plaintiff too far away
from contract to be included either as a donee or a creditor beneficiary).
58. Ketcher v. Sheet Metal Workers' Internat. Ass'n, 115 F. Supp. 802, 33
LRRM 2352 (E.D. Ark. 1953).
59. "It would be improper for the employees to bring the action in their
own name." UAW v. Wilson Athletic Goods Mfg. Co., 26 LRRM 2383 (N.D.
Ill. 1950); see Schatte v. International Alliance of Theatrical Stage Employees, 84
F. Supp. 669, 672 (S.D. Cal. 1949). But cf. Slade v. Sun Shipbuilding and Dry
Dock Co., 23 LRRM 2054 (E.D. Pa. 1948).
60. Schatte v. International Alliance of Theatrical Stage Employees, 84 F.
Supp. 669 (S.D. Cal. 1949); see also UAW v. Wilson Athletic Goods Mfg. Co., 26
LRRM 2383 (N.D. Ill. 1950).
61. United Protective Workers v. Ford Motor Co., 194 F.2d 997, 29 LRRM
2596 (7th Cir. 1952). The employee, however, joining under Rule 20(a), FED.
R. Civ. P., cannot rely on § 301 jurisdiction but must allege proper jurisdictional
facts such as diversity and amount. Ibid.
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to a suit by the individual employees. 62 It is not clear whether the
union may be their litigating agent.63 It would seem the better view
to permit a union to sue for violation of rights running to the indi-
vidual employees under the collective bargaining agreement, to avoid
a multiplicity of suits and to guarantee a remedy to employees in a
state which may not provide one. Indeed, the view may be taken that
union rights exist in all situations where individual employees' rights
exist.
Section 303 clearly contemplates actions by employers against
unions. 64 This right of action has been construed to include the pri-
mary as well as the neutral employer.65 A broad interpretation of the
scope of the prohibitions in the section has resulted in holding two
unions, conspiring to induce a secondary boycott, as proper parties
defendant.66
Attempts by particular unions to evade the application of these
sections, through contentions that they were not proper parties, have
been largely rebuffed. For example, the union-filing requirements of
Sections 9 (f), (g) and (h) of the Act have been construed as requisites
only to utilization by unions of Board processes;67 they do not apply
in suits by or against unions under Sections 301 and 303.68 Moreover,
a union which represents both employees subject to and employees
exempt from the coverage of the Act is not immune to suit under
62. Slade v. Sun Shipbuilding and Dry Dock Co., 23 LRRM 2054 (E.D. Pa.
1948) (union must be joined as a party to action for reinstatement brought
by individual employee against employer under § 301).
63. Rock Drilling and Common Laborers' Local Union No. 17 v. Mason &
Hangar Co., 90 F. Supp. 539, 26 LRRM 2218 (S.D.N.Y. 1950) (§ 301(b) defines
capacity only when union rights are involved; union not made the litigating
agent for those it represents). See also Local 50 v. General Baking Co., 97 F.
Supp. 73, 28 LRRM 2039 (S.D.N.Y. 1951).
64. Nash-Kelvinator Corp. v. Grand Rapids Bldg. & Const. Trades Council
30 LRRM 2466 (W.D. Mich. 1952); see also Deena Products Co. v. United Brick
& Clay Workers, 195 F.2d 612, 30 LRRM 2324 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 344 U.S.
822 (1952). The language of § 303 seems sufficiently broad to permit actions
by a union plaintiff.
65. United Brick & Clay Workers v. Deena Artware, Inc., 198 F.2d 637, 30
LRRM 2485 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 344 U.S. 897 (1952) (language "whoever
shall be injured" has plain, unambiguous, meaning).
66. Pepper & Potter, Inc. v. Local 977, UAW, 103 F. Supp. 684, 29 LRRM
2580 (S.D.N.Y. 1952); Bethlehem Steel Co. v. Industrial Union of Marine &
Shipbuilding Workers, 115 F. Supp. 231, 32 LRRM 2767 (E.D.N.Y. 1953)
(language of section shows an intention on part of Congress to give broad
scope to prohibitions in the section). In a § 303 action alleging a conspiracy
by unions and individual employees, verdicts in favor of the employees and
against the unions were not inconsistent; the employees may have committed
the acts, yet not have acted in concert with the unions. Curto v. International
Longshoremen's & Warehousemen's Union, 107 F. Supp. 805, 31 LRRM 2168
(D. Ore. 1952).
67. Gerry of California v. Superior Court, 32 Cal.2d 119, 194 P.2d 689, 22
LRRM 2279 (1948) (non-compliance with filing requirements does not vest
jurisdiction in state court of action for injunction against secondary boycott).
68. UAW v. Wilson Athletic Goods Mfg. Co., 26 LRRM 2383 (N.D. 1ll. 1950);
United Steel Workers v. Shakespeare Co., 84 F. Supp. 267, 23 LRRM 2341
(W.D. Mich. 1949).
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these sections.69 A union, once certified, may not avoid the effects of
Section 303 (a) (3) except by following Board decertification pro-
cedures; disclaimer or transfer is here ineffectual.70
Joinder of Actions
Federal Rule 18 (a) permits the joinder of Section 301 contract claims
and Section 303 tort claims against an opposing party.7 1
Prior Determination
An NLRB determination of an unfair labor practice charge in a pub-
lic proceeding by the Board may precede an action for damages by
individuals in a private suit under either of the binate sections. While
the issues before the Board in the one case and before the court in the
other may be substantially identical, the parties in and the natures
of each proceeding differ to the extent that the principles of collateral
estoppel do not apply.7 2
Inconsistencies between a Board 8 (b) (4) order and a 303 judgment
may, therefore, result from the same fact situation. The doctrine of
"primary jurisdiction" which might have served to obviate this
anomaly and to produce uniformity through substantive integration
has thus far been given no efficacy.
7 3
REMDIES
That Congress contemplated relief in the form of money damages
is clear from the language of these sections.74 Whether specific refer-
ence to this relief accompanied by silence as to other remedies evi-
69. Waialua Agricultural Co., Ltd. v. United Sugar Workers, 114 F. Supp.
243, 32 LRRM 2440 (D. Hawaii 1953) (union which represented both agricul-
tural and nonagricultural workers not immune to suit under § 301).
70. Pepper & Potter, Inc. v. Local 977, UAW, 103 F. Supp. 684, 29 LRRM
2580 (S.D.N.Y. 1952). Cf. International Union of Operating Engineers v.
Dablem Const. Co., 193 F.2d 470, 29 LRRM 2271 (6th Cir. 1951) (union may
not by use of "cooling-off' notice provisions of § 9 (d) escape liability for
later breach of no-strike provision in contract).
71. Colonial Hardwood Flooring Co. v. International Union United Furniture
Workers, 76 F. Supp. 493, 21 LRRM 2340 (D. Md.), aff'd, 168 F.2d 33, 22 LRRM
2102 (4th Cir. 1948); see Ludlow Mfg. & Sales Co. v. Textile Workers Union,
108 F. Supp. 45, 48, 30 LRRM 2667 (D. Del. 1952).
72. Boeing Airplane Co. v. Aeronautical Industrial District Lodge No. 751,
91 F. Supp. 596, 26 LRRM 2324 (W.D. Wash. 1950), aff'd, 188 F.2d 356, 27 LRRM
2556 (9th Cir. 1951) (existence of contract in issue).
73. Employment of these doctrines appears precluded by the language of the
Supreme Court in International Longshoremen's and Warehousemen's Union v.
Juneau Spruce Corp., 342 U.S. 237, 72 Sup. Ct. 235, 96 L. Ed. 275 (1952). But
see Comment, 61 YALE L.J. 745, 752 (1952).
74. See Alcoa S.S. Co. v. McMahon, 173 F.2d 567, 23 LRRM 2533 (2d Cir.
1949); International Union United Furniture Workers v. Colonial Hardwood
Flooring Co., 168 F.2d 33, 22 LRRM 2102 (4th Cir. 1948); International Long-
shoremen's and Warehousemen's Union v. Libby, McNeill & Libby, 114 F.
Supp. 249, 32 LRRM 2588 (D. Hawaii 1953); Ludlow Mfg. & Sales Co. v. Textile
Workers Union, 108 F. Supp. 45, 30 LRRM 2667 (D. Del. 1952); Nash-Kelvinator
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dences an intention that that relief be exclusive is not clear.75 Also
not clear is the applicability and effect of the Norris-LaGuardia, De-
claratory Judgment, Federal Interpleader and Federal Arbitration
Acts on the power of the court to grant the specific relief sought.
Damages
Determination of actual damages is apparently consistent with rules
traditional in tort and contract actions. 6 Actionable injuries under
both sections essentially result in compensable typical business losses,
such as standby expenses, product spoilage, demurrage and lost in-
come. 7 The duty to mitigate damages appears to be stringent.78
The failure of Section 303 to provide for other than "the damages
... sustained" presents the problem of the propriety of punitive dam-
ages. While the language suggests that compensation was intended to
Corp. v. Grand Rapids Bldg. and Const. Trades Council, 30 LRRM 2466 (W.D.
Mich. 1952); Textile Workers Union v. Berryton Mills, 28 LRRM 2540 (N.D. Ga.
1951); United Steel Workers v. Shakespeare Co., 84 F. Supp. 267, 23 LRRM
2341 (W.D. Mich. 1949). Judgments are enforceable only against union assets.
§ 301 (b). Actions thereon may be brought in state courts. Juneau Spruce Corp.
v. International Longshoremen's and Warehousemen's Union, 32 LRRM 2592
(Cal. App. 1953). Supplemental proceedings to discover union assets also may
be brought in state court. Arnold v. National Union of Marine Cooks, 257
P.2d 629, 32 LRRM 2324 (Wash. 1953).
75. "[§ 301] conferred jurisdiction for the sole purpose of actions for dam-
ages." International Longshoremen's and Warehousemen's Union v. Libby,
McNeill & Libby, 114 F. Supp. 249, 251, 32 LRRM 2588 (D. Hawaii 1953); see
Amalgamated Ass'n of Street and Motor Coach Employees v. Dixie Motor
Coach Corp., 170 F.2d 902, 23 LRRM 2092 (8th Cir. 1948); Haspel v. Bonnaz,
Singer & Hand Embroiderers, 112 F. Supp. 944, 32 LRRM 2244 (S.D.N.Y. 1953)
(damages exclusive remedy). Contra: Milk and Ice Cream Drivers and Dairy
Employees Union v. Gillespie Milk Products Corp., 203 F.2d 650, 31 LRRM
2586 (6th Cir. 1953).
76. See Deena Products Co. v. United Brick & Clay Workers, 195 F.2d 612,
30 LRRM 2324 (6th Cir.) (damages suffered through secondary boycott de-
pendent on contractual relations of plaintiff with its subsidiary which rela-
tions did not exist), cert. denied, 344 U.S. 822 (1952); United Electrical, Radio &
Machine Workers v. Oliver Corp., 205 F.2d 376, 32 LRRM 2270 (8th Cir. 1953)
(jury instructed on "contemplation of the parties at the time the contract
was made" rule).
77. See, e.g., United Electrical, Radio & Machine Workers v. Oliver Corp.,
205 F.2d 376, 32 LRRM 2270 (8th Cir. 1953) (jury correctly instructed to de-
termine fair and reasonable necessary standby expenses although the plant
was not completely closed during the strikes); Alcoa S.S. Co. v. Conerford, 25
LRRM 2199 (S.D.N.Y. 1949). In International Union of Operating Engineers
v. Dahlem Const. Co., 193 F.2d 470, 29 LRRM 2271 (6th Cir. 1951), damages
based on similar losses were asked, but were not considered excessive and were
not contested. Section 303 (b) provides for the recovery of "the cost of the
suit." Query, whether this may include attorney's fees and other costs incident
to preparation of the suit for court.
78. In the Alcoa Steamship case, supra note 77, in violation of the contract,
the union refused to work more than eight men in the hold in unloading
freight; work stopped on August 20 and was not resumed until August 25.
The company sued for $16,000 damages. The court held that the employer
was under a duty to mitigate damages by allowing unloading to continue
with eight men in the hold, that two days instead of the six was a reasonable
time to try to persuade the union to accede, that only 1/3 damages would be
awarded on the basis of two days lost time; the court allowed, however, the
company to recover for the nonproductivity of those men above eight who
could have more economically unloaded the cargo. Cf. Schlenk v. Lehigh
Valley R.R., 74 F. Supp. 569 (D.N.J. 1947).
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-be the standard of recovery, the tortious nature of secondary pressure
gravitates in favor of punitive damages where customarily permitted.79
Injunction
Injunctive relief, sought in lieu of or in addition to monetary dam-
ages, has usually been refused.80 The strongest argument against the
granting of injunctive relief has been the applicability of the Norris-
LaGuardia prohibitions.81 The only express relaxation of those pro-
hibitions in the Taft-Hartley Act has been to permit limited requests
by the Board or the Attorney General.82 Absent such express relaxa-
tion in regard to private litigants, it seems clear that the prohibitions
79. The recent precedent of the Fourth Circuit denying recovery of punitive
damages may well be persuasive in other federal courts. See Patton v. United
Mine Workers, 22 U.S.L. WEEK. 2464 (4th Cir. Mar. 15, 1954), reversing 114 F.
Supp. 596, 32 LRRM 2642 (W.D. Va. 1953).
80. Amazon Cotton Mill Co. v. Textile Workers Union, 167 F.2d 183, 21
LRRM 2605 (4th Cir. 1948); International Longshoremen's and Warehouse-
men's Union v. Libby, McNeill & Libby, 115 F. Supp. 123, 32 LRRM 2728 (D.
Hawaii 1953) (legislative history discussed); Haspel v. Bonnaz, Singer &
Hand Embroiderers, 112 F. Supp. 944, 32 LRRM 2244 (S.D.N.Y. 1953); Textile
Workers Union v. Berryton Mills, 28 LRRM 2540 (N.D. Ga. 1951); Local 937
v. Royal Typewriter Co., 88 F. Supp. 669, 24 LRRM 2438 (D. Conn. 1949);
Duris v. Phelps Dodge Copper Products Corp., 87 F. Supp. 229, 25 LRRM 2089
(D.N.J. 1949); United Packinghouse Workers v. Wilson & Co., 80 F. Supp. 563,
22 LRRM 2297 (N.D. Ill. 1948); Alcoa S.S. Co. v. McMahon, 81 F. Supp. 541,
23 LRRM 2051 (S.D.N.Y 1948), af'd, 173 F.2d 567, 23 LRRM 2533 (2d Cir.
1949); see Bakery Sales Drivers Union v. Wagshal, 333 U.S. 437, 442, 68 Sup.
Ct. 630, 92 L. Ed. 792 (1948); International Longshoremen's & Warehousemen's
Union v. Sunset Line & Twine Co., 77 F. Supp. 119, 21 LRRM 2635 (N.D. Cal.
1948). The federal court may refuse removal jurisdiction on the ground that
no original jurisdiction exists. Associated Tel. Co., Ltd. v. Communication
Workers, 114 F. Supp. 334, 32 LRRM 2485 (S.D. Cal. 1953); Castle & Cooke
Terminals, Ltd. v. Local 137, 110 F. Supp. 247, 31 LRRM 2480 (D. Hawaii
1953); American Optical Co. v. Andert, 108 F. Supp. 252, 31 LRRM 2312 (W.D.
Mo. 1952); Corrado Bros., Inc. v. Building and Const. Trades Council of Dela-
ware, 29 LRRM 2141 (D. Del. 1951). Contra: Direct Transit Lines, Inc. v. Local
Union No. 406, 29 LRRM 2492, 30 LRRM 2471 (W.D. Mich.), mandamus denied,
199 F.2d 89, 31 LRRM 2004 (6th Cir. 1952); Nash-Kelvinator Corp. v. Grand
Rapids Bldg. and Const. Trades Council, 30 LRRM 2466 (W.D. Mich. 1952).
Injunctive relief is of course proper where plaintiff brings himself within the
conditions of Norris-LaGuardia. Bakery Sales Drivers Union v. Wagshal, 333
U.S. 437, 68 Sup. Ct. 630, 92 L. Ed. 792 (1948); Milk and Ice- Cream Drivers
and Dairy Employees Union v. Gillespie Milk Products Corp., 203 F.2d 650,
31 LRRM 2586 (6th Cir. 1953); Dixie Motor Coach Corp. v. Amalgamated
Ass'n of Street and Motor Coach Employees, 74 F. Supp. 952, 21 LRRM 2193
(W.D. Ark. 1947), rev'd, 170 F.2d 902, 23 LRRM 2092 (8th Cir. 1948); Mountain
States Div. No. 17, Communications Workers v. Mountain States Tel. & Tel. Co.,
81 F. Supp. 397, 22 LRRM 2495 (D. Colo. 1948). One district court has held
Norri -LaGuardia inapplicable where there is sought a mandatory injunction
requiring defendant to perform its contract. Textile Workers Union v. Aleo
Mfg. Co., 94 F. Supp. 626 (M.D.N.C. 1950). See also 6 VAND. L. REv. 405 (1953).
81. Cases cited note 80 supra.
82. Section 10(h) of the Act expressly exempts federal courts in granting
appropriate injunctive relief from the limitations of the Norris-LaGuardia
Act. 61 STAT. 146 (1947), 29 U.S.C.A. § 160(e) (Supp. 1953). Appropriate re-
lief is that sought by the NLRB or the Attorney General in certain -specified
cases. Id. §§ 160(e), (j), (1), 178. See Amalgamated Ass'n of Street and
1954]
VANDERBILT LAW REVIEW
were intended to apply.83 The failure of these sections to specify the
availability of injunctive relief,84 and the limited grant solely to public
officers to secure such relief, are further indications that injunction is
not a proper remedy under these sections.a5
Specific Performance and Arbitration
Specific performance of an arbitration clause has in one case been
granted.8 6 On the basis of this holding specific enforcement of other
aspects of these agreements may be made available. The application
of the Norris-LaGuardia Act to suits for specific performance as a
form of negative injunction8 7 and to injunctive enforcement of arbi-
tration awards has not been determined.88
The Federal Arbitration Act excepts from its operation "contracts of
employment of . . . workers engaged in foreign or interstate com-
merce." 89 There is some doubt as to whether collective bargaining
agreements are within the ambit of this exclusion.90 Most courts have
refused to grant the stay of proceedings order provided for in the
Arbitration Act on one or more of several grounds: (1) the statute
Motor Coach Employees v. Dixie Motor Coach Corp., 170 F.2d 902, 23 LRRM
2092 (8th Cir. 1948); Amazon Cotton Mill Co. v. Textile Workers Union, 167
F.2d 183, 21 LRRM 2605 (4th Cir. 1948); Direct Transit Lines, Inc. v. Local
Union No. 406, 30 LRRM 2471 (W.D. Mich. 1952); United Packinghouse Work-
ers v. Wilson & Co., 80 F. Supp. 563, 22 LRRM 2297 (N.D. 111. 1948).
83. Contra: Milk and Ice Cream Drivers and Dairy Employees Union v.
Gillespie Milk Products Corp., 203 F.2d 650, 651, 31 LRRM 2586 (6th Cir.
1953) ('we think the unqualified use of the word 'suits' . . . authorizes in-
junctive process for the full enforcement of the substantive rights created by
section 301 (a)....").
84. "[T]he language of section 303(b) is explicit in providing for the re-
covery of damages but makes no mention of injunctive relief." Haspel v.
Bonnaz, Singer & Hand Embroiderers, 112 F. Supp. 944, 946, 32 LRRM 2244
(S.D.N.Y. 1953).
85. "In no other cases does the act confer jurisdiction upon the District
Courts to deal with unfair labor practices; and it is hardly reasonable to sup-
pose that Congress intended the District Courts to have general power to
grant injunctive relief... while limiting with such meticulous care the cases in
which those courts might grant injunctive relief upon petition of the Labor
Board or the Attorney General acting under the direction of the President.
Expressio unius est exclusio alterius". Amazon Cotton Mill Co. v. Textile
Workers Union, 167 F.2d 183, 187, 21 LRRM 2605 (4th Cir. 1948) (legislative
history considered in detail). See also Associated Tel. Co. Ltd. v. Communica-
tion Workers 114 F. Supp. 334, 32 LRRM 2485 (S.D. Cal. 1953).
86. "§ 301 provides, as a nationally available remedy, specific performance
of arbitration clauses in labor contracts in industries affecting commerce."
Textile Workers Union v. American Thread Co., 113 F. Supp. 137, 141, 32 LRRM
2205 (D. Mass. 1953), 7 VAND. L. R.V. 140 (the decision may be based on either
state or federal law).
87. See Textile Workers v. Aleo Mfg. Co., 94 F. Supp. 626, 27 LRRM 2164
(M.D.N.C. 1950) (mandatory injunction allowed).
88. See Alcoa S.S. Co. v. McMahon, 81 F. Supp. 541, 23 LRRM 2051 (S.D.N.Y.
1948), af'd, 173 F.2d 567, 23 LRRM 2533 (2d Cir. 1949).
89. 9 U.S.C.A. § 1 (Supp. 1953).
90. The court in Lewittes & Sons v. United Furniture Workers, 95 F. Supp.
851, 27 LRRM 2490 (S.D.N.Y. 1951), after reviewing the cases, came to the
conclusion that the language of exception referred to personal contracts of
employment, not collective bargaining agreements; a stay order was, therefore,
granted as to an action for breach under § 301.
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excludes from its operation collective bargaining agreements,9' (2)
the likelihood that the existence and validity of the contract itself will-
be put in issue precludes arbitration,9 2 and (3) the narrow language of
the contract arbitration clause is thought to evidence an intent that
a dispute under rather than breach of contract should be arbitrable.93
Declaratory Judgment
Exclusiveness of the monetary damage remedy militates against the
entertainment of suits for declaratory judgments. It would seem,
however, that the remedy is conducive to the stability of labor con-
tracts in particular, and should be freely allowed.- Where declaratory
judgments are permitted,95 there is doubt as to the applicability of the
Norris-LaGuardia Act to injunctions sought pursuant thereto.9 6
Interpleader
Interpleader may prove a very valuable remedial device particularly
where each of two rival unions asserts a claim to check-off dues under
a collective bargaining contract.97 A realistic interpretation of Section
301 (a), recognizing potential as well as actual violation as a basis
91. International Furniture Workers v. Colonial Hardwood Flooring 'Co.,
168 F.2d 33, 22 LRRM 2102 (4th Cir. 1948); Ludlow Mfg. & Sales Co. v. Textile
Workers Union. 108 F. Supp. 45, 30 LRRM 2667 (D. Del. 1952); Matson Nay. Co.
v. National Union of Marine Cooks, 22 LRRM 2138 (N.D. Cal. 1948).
92. Metal Polishers v. Rubin, 85 F. Supp. 363, 24 LRRM 2430 (E.D. Pa. 1949).
If the entire contract is void, no provision for arbitration remains; arbitration
proceedings taken thereunder would be without effect.
93. Colonial Hardwood Flooring Co. v. International Union United Furniture
Workers, 76 F. Supp. 493, 21 LRRM 2340 (D. Md.), affd, 168 F.2d 33, 22 LRRM
2102 (4th Cir. 1948); Metal Polishers v. Rubin, 85 F. Supp. 363, 24 LRRM 2430
(E.D. Pa. 1949). Where broad language is employed ("all grievances, com-
plaints, differences or disputes arising out of or relating to this agreement,
or the breach thereof"), the court may find an intent to arbitrate breach of
the contract itself. Lewittes & Sons v. United Furniture Workers, 95 F. Supp.
851, 27 LRRM 2490 (S.D.N.Y. 1951).
94. The Federal Declaratory Judgment Act, however, does not confer juris- -
diction; the jurisdictional requirements of § 301 must be met. International
Longshoremen's and Warehousemen's Union v. Libby, McNeill & Libby, 114 F.Supp. 249, 32 LRRM 2588 (D. Hawaii 1953).
95. Milk and Ice Cream Drivers and Dairy Employees Union v. Gillespie
Milk Products Corp., 203 F.2d 650, 31 LRRM 2586 (6th Cir. 1953); United Pro-
tective Workers v. Ford Motor Co., 194 F.2d 997, 29 LRRM 2596 (7th Cin
1952), on remand, 31 LRRM 2597 (N.D. Ill. 1953); AFL v. Western Union Tel.
Co., 179 F.2d 535, 25 LRRM 2327 (6th Cir. 1950); Lima-Hamilton Corp. v.
Local No. 106, UAW, 27 LRRM 2260 (N.D. Ohio 1950) semble; Studio Carpen-
ters Local Union No. 946 v. Loew's, Inc., 84 F. Supp. 675, 24 LRRM 2493 (S.D.
Cal. 1949). Contra: International Longshoremen's and Warehousemen's Union
v. Libby, McNeill & Libby, 115 F. Supp. 123, 32 LRRM 2728 (D. Hawaii 1953).
96. 'See United Protective Workers v. Ford Motor Co., 194 F.2d 997, 29
LRRM 2596 (7th Cir. 1952); AFL v. Western Union Tel. Co., 179 F.2d 535, 25
LRRM 2327 (6th Cir. 1950); Alcoa S.S. Co. v. McMahon, 81 F. Supp. 541, 23
LRRM 2051 (S.D.N.Y. 1948), aff'd, 173 F.2d 567, 23 LRRM 2533 (2d Cir. 1949);
see Textile Workers Union v. Aleo Mfg. Co., 94 F. Supp. 626, 629, 27 LRRM
2164 (M.D.N.C. 1950).
97. In Sun Shipbuilding & Dry-Dock Co. v. Industrial Union of Marine &
Shipbuilding Workers, 95 F. Supp. 50, 27 LRRM 2250 (E.D. Pa. 1950),
interpleader brought under 28 U.S.C.A. § 1335 (1950) was dismissed because
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therefor, properly supplies the jurisdictional grounds requisite to
itilization of the interpleader device under Rule 22.98
Election of Remedies
The parties to a collective bargaining agreement, as in any other
contract, will be held to their election of remedy. Thus an election
to rescind will preclude an action for damages. 99
CHOICE OF LAW
Whether the creation of federal *substantive rights presupposes the
application of a federal common law is a question implicit in all cases
based on 'federal-question jurisdiction. Most persuasive is the argu-
ment that federal rights require national uniformity of treatment,
in contradistinction to the policy favoring intra-state uniformity in
state-created rights. The conclusion developing in other areas is that
a federal common law is applicable in the adjudication of federal
rights. This resultant national uniformity is particularly desirable in
the'field of labor relations problems national in scope. Notwithstand-
ing the failure of Congress in these two sections to particularize sub-
stantive rights, or to dictate the development of a federal common
law,100 most courts have considered that state law is inapplicable in the
determination of the rights created by these sections.10 '
the requisite diversity was not present. Two dicta points are worthy of
note: (1) the international and the two rival unions were considered indis-
pensable parties to a proper action of interpleader; (2) the dispute did not
involve a violation of a contract, but an intra-union squabble. The position
as to (2) would unnecessarily limit the scope of § 301 jurisdiction. See also
International Union of Electrical Radio & Machine Workers v. United Elec-
trical, Radio & Machine Workers, 192 F.2d 847, 29 LRRM 2170 (6th Cir. 1951)
(no appeal from order of interpleader).
98. FED. R. Cwv. P. 22. "The Temedy'herein provided is in addition to and
in no way supersedes or limits the remedy provided by Title 28, U.S.C. §§ 1335,
1397, and 2361." Id. 22(2).
99. Boeing Airplane Co. v. Aeronautical Industrial Dist. Lodge No. 751, 26
LRRM 2324 (W.D. Wash. 1950), af'd, 188 F.2d 356, 27 LRRM 2556 (9th Cir.
1951). See also Gladding, McBean & Co. v. Warehouse Union, 27 LRRM 2263
(Cal. Super. Ct. 1951) (notice of modification is not equivalent to notice of
termination and does not terminate contract); cf. International Union of
Operating Engineers v. Dahlem Const. Co., 193 F.2d 470, 29 LRRM 2271 (6th
Cir. 1951). See also Ludlow Mg. & Sales Co. v. Textile Workers Union, 108
F. Supp. 45, 30 LRRM 2667 (D. Del. 1952) (suggests prior breach may absolve
of liability if material and not severable from second breach).
100. "[Congress] did not indicate whether it intended the federal courts
to apply the contract law of the -states wherein they sit, or to develop a
separate and distinct federal common law of collective bargaining contracts
where interstate commerce is affected." International Longshoremen's and
Warehousemen's Union v. Libby, McNeill & Libby, 114 F. Supp. 249, 250, 32
LRRM 2588 (D. Hawaii 1953); see also Textile Workers Union v. American
Thredd Co., 113 F. Supp. 137, 32 LRRM 2205 (D. Mass. 1953), 7 VAND. L. REV.
140.
101. International Union of Operating Engineers v. Dahlem Const. Co., 193
F.2d 470, 29 LRRM 2271 (6th Cir. 1951); Shirley-Herman Co. v. International
Hod Carriers, 182 F.2d 806, 26 LRRM 2258 (2d Cir. 1950); Textile' Workers
Union v. Aleo Mfg. Co., 94 F. Supp. 626, 27 LRRM 2164 (M.D.N.C. 1950).
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Imbued'with Erie dogma, some courts have deemed state lawccon-
trolling in Statute of Frauds and Statute of Limitations problerms,
through argument that the enforcement of the federal rights must
conform to the remedy prescribed by the law of the state where, the
action is brought.10 2 Whatever the problem is labeled - substantive,
procedural or remedial - the right is federal, the forum is federal;
federal law, statutory or common law, should apply.10 3 The federal
courts should fend for themselves in these matters without reference
to state law except as it may be used in determining the federal com-
mon law.10 Where practicable, however, the establishment .of statu-
tory guides is most desirable.
Joseph F. DiRisio
Joseph Martin, Jr.
102. "Although the contract and federal jurisdiction to enforce it arise-out of
a federal statute, the enforcement of the right must conform to the remedy
prescribed by the law of the state where the action is brought." Hamilton
Foundry & Machine Co. v. International Molders & Foundry Workers Union,
193 F.2d 209, 215, 29 LRRM 2223 (6th Cir. 1951) (Ohio Statute of Frauds held
applicable); cf. Albrecht v. Indiana Harbor Belt R.R., 178 F.2d 577, 25 LRRM
2205 (7th Cir. 1949), cert. denied, 339 U.S. 949 (1950) (action barred by
Indiana Statute of Limitations).
103. The Supreme Court, in Clearfield Trust Co. v. United States; 318 U.S.
363, 63 Sup. Ct. 573, 87 L. Ed. 838 (1943), recognized that essentially-federal
rights were to be governed by federal law exclusively. But see Austrian v.
Williams, 198 F.2d 697 (2d Cir. 1952), 6 VAND. L. REV. 401 (1953).
104. Adoption of the six months limitations period applicable to unfair
labor practices would be inconsistent with the divorced treatment hereto-
fore accorded § 8 and §§ 301, 303. See Comment, 61 YALE L.J. 745, 752 (1952).
It would appear that the general equity doctrine of laches may apply, however.
APPENDIX
SEcTioN 301:
Suits by and against labor organizations -venue, amount, and citizenship
(a) Suits for violation of contracts between an employer and a labor or-
ganization representing employees in an industry affecting commerce as de-
fined in this chapter, or between any such labor organizations, may be. brought
in any district court of the United 'States having jurisdiction of the parties,
without respect to the amount in controversy or without regard to the. citizen-
ship of the parties.
Responsibilitji for acts of agent; entity for purposes of suit; enforcement of
money judgments
(b) Any labor organization which represents employees in an industty af-
fecting commerce as defined in this chapter and any employer whose activities
affect commerce as defined in this chapter shall be bound by the acts of its
agents. Any such labor organization may sue or be sued as an entity and
in behalf of the employees whom it represents in the courts of 'the United
States. Any money judgment against a labor organization in a district- court
of the United States shall be enforceable only against the organization as an
entity and against its assets, and shall not be enforceable against any individual
member or his assets.
Jurisdiction
(c) For the purpose of actions and proceedings by or against labor organiza-
tions in the district courts of the United States, district courts shall be deemed
to have jurisdiction of a labor organization (1) in the district in which such
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organization maintains its principal office, or (2) in any district in which its
duly authorized officers or agents are engaged in representing or acting for
employee members.
Service of process
d) The service of summons, subpena, or other legal process of any court
of the United States upon an officer or agent of a labor organization, in his
capacity as such, shall constitute service upon the labor organization.
Determination of question of agency
(e) For the purposes of this section, in determining whether any person is
acting as an "agent" of another person so as to make such other person re-
sponsible for his acts, the question of whether the specific acts performed
were actually authorized or susbsequently ratified shall not be controlling.
61 STAT. 156 (1947), 29 U.S.C.A. § 185 (Supp. 1953).
SEcTioN 303:
Boycotts and other unlawful combinations; right to sue; jurisdiction; limita-
tions; damages
(a) It shall be unlawful, for the purposes of this section only, in an industry
or activity affecting commerce, for any labor organization to enqage in, or
to ' hiduce or encourage the employees of any employer to engage in, a strike
or a concerted refusal in the course of their employment to use, manu-
facture, process, transport, or otherwise handle or work on any goods,
articles, materials, or commodities or to perform any services, where an
object thereof is -
(1) forcing or requiring any employer or self-employed person to join
any labor or employer organization or any employer or other person to
cease using, selling, handling, transporting, or otherwise dealing in the
products of any other producer, processor, or manufacturer, or to cease
doing business with any other person;
(2) forcing or requiring any other employer to recognize or bargain
with a labor organization as the representative of his employees unless
such labor organization has been certified as the representative of such em-
ployees under the provisions of section 159 of this title;
(3) forcing or requiring any employer to recognize or bargain with a
particular labor organization as the representative of his employees if
another labor organization has been certified as the representative of such
employees under the provisions of section 159 of this title;
(4) forcing or requiring any employer to assign particular work to
employees in a particular labor organization or in a particular trade,
craft, or class rather than to employees or another labor organization or
in another trade, craft, or class unless such employer is failing to conform
to an order or certification of the National Labor Relations Board determ-
ining the bargaining representative for employees performing such work.
Nothing contained in this subsection shall be construed to make un-
lawful a refusal by any person to enter upon the premises of any employer
(other than his own employer), if the employees of such employer are
engaged in a strike ratified or approved by a representative of such em-
ployees whom such employer is required to recognize under subchapter
II of this chapter.
(b) Whoever shall be injured in his business or property by reason of any
violation of subsection (a) of this section may sue therefor in any district
court of the United States subject to the limitations and provisions of section
185 of this title without respect to the amount in controversy, or in any other
court having jurisdiction of the parties, and shall recover the damages by him
sustained and the cost of the suit. 61 STAT. 158 (1947), 29 U.S.C.A. § 187 (Supp.
1953).
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